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Abstract There exist dual features of internationalization and regionalization in
the current international monetary system, and the U.S. dollar is still in a dominant
position in the system. A lack of relevant institutional constraints has led to insti-
tutional deficiencies and systematic risks in the international monetary system, and
resulted in the frequent financial crises in the world in recent years. As an emerging
economy closely related to the current international monetary system, China has
responsibilities and obligations to participate actively in international monetary
system reform and push forward international monetary system reform through
institutional supply.
Keywords China  International monetary system  Institutional innovation 
Institutional supply
1 Introduction
The international monetary system is a relatively broad concept: generally speaking,
it usually refers to the sum of the international currency systems, the international
financial institutions, and the established international monetary order which is
formed from the habits and history of humankind (He 2006, p. 290). The
international monetary system generally includes the following: (1) which currency
will be used in international communication—the gold standard or inconvertible
credit currency; (2) exchange rate arrangements among countries, pegging a
currency or allowing exchange rates to be changed according to demand and supply;
and (3) how to adjust the imbalance of foreign exchange receipts and payments
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among different countries (Huang 2000, p. 422). Since the East Asian financial
crisis in 1997, the different problems triggered by the international monetary system
have become the concern of international society. The global financial crisis, which
resulted from the sub-prime mortgage crisis of America in 2008, has pushed the
reform of the international monetary system to the cusp. Meanwhile, the
maladjustment between the current international monetary system and the
development of the global real economy has led to a necessity for international
monetary system reform (Justin 2012, pp. 2–4).
With the deepening of the reform and opening-up policy, China now has an
increasingly strong interdependence with the world; meanwhile, the current
international monetary system may also have a substantial impact on China.
China’s current economy has undergone rapid development, and its GDP was
ranked second in the world in 2010. Thus, to ensure the security of national
economic development and national finance, China should play an important role in
the process of reforming the international monetary system. The global financial
crisis may be regarded as a good opportunity for international monetary system
reform, and the world may have concerns over how China grasps this opportunity to
take part in reforming the international monetary system. How can China find the
best solution for reform when the international monetary system is not only related
to China itself, but also related to changes in the current international monetary
structure?
2 Institutional Deficiencies in the Current International Monetary System
Since the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1976, the international monetary
system has entered into the Jamaica system era.1 This has simply meant the decline
of the U.S. dollar hegemony, the main content of which is the ‘‘double hook,’’ But
not the end of it. Under the Jamaica system, the international monetary pattern has
developed toward the direction of diversification, but the U.S. dollar is still in a
dominant position in the current international monetary system.
There also exists the feature of global public goods in the international monetary
system (Charles 1973, pp. 56–61).To some extent, the current system dominated by
the U.S. may reduce relative transaction costs (Wang 2007, pp. 51–55). A few U.S.
scholars and politicians regularly use hegemonic stability theory to provide
theoretical support for the U.S. dollar hegemony. The core content of hegemonic
stability is that there must be a hegemonic state to maintain a stable international
financial order, and the hegemonic state should have superb capability to provide
international public goods from which all the states in the international monetary
1 In January 1976, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Council held a meeting in Jamaica’s capital
Kingston, discussed the terms of the IMF, and signed the ‘‘Jamaica agreement.’’ In April of the same year,
the IMF Council passed through the second amendment of ‘‘Jamaica agreement,’’ meaning that the
Jamaica system was established. The core content of the Jamaica system includes diversification of the




system may benefit. However, the hegemonic stability theory does not provide a
valid explanation to the changes to the international monetary mechanism. Robert
(2005), pp. 88–105 thinks that the hegemonic stability theory has its flaws in three
aspects: first, it focuses on the changes of tangible resources, but ignores the fact
that the United States’ ability to maintain the mechanism does not depend on the
possession of tangible resources, but on its confidence in dealing with international
financial affairs; second, it fails to recognize the dual characteristics of the U.S.’s
powerful position in the international monetary system since 1971; third, the index
of GDP, as a measure of power resources, leads to false prophecy upon the collapse
of the hegemonic state. At the same time, some practices have proved that there are
severe institutional deficiencies in the Jamaica system characterized by the U.S.
dollar hegemony, and the following context will make further analysis.
2.1 The U.S. Dollar Standard of International Monetary System Exacerbated
the Imbalance of International Payments
So far, the U.S. dollar standard of the Jamaican system is that essentially the U.S.
dollar has dual identities:sovereign currency, and the international currency
standard (Chen and Chen 2010, pp. 56–61). The U.S. dollar standard is a center–
peripheral international monetary system: the United States is at its core, while
emerging markets and developing countries are on the periphery. There is no doubt
that, in this structure, the U.S. dollar has characteristics of a hegemonic currency.
Figure 1 is a concise description of the situation of international resource flows in
the current international monetary system. Europe and other developed countries
have invested in or bought a great amount of U.S. financial assets, while the U.S.
has received a large amount of real capital through the sale of these financial assets.
Emerging markets and developing countries mainly sell goods and services to the
United States, while the United States uses the U.S. dollar or bonds to buy these
goods and services. For this reason, the majority of emerging markets and
developing countries have accumulated large amounts of the U.S. dollar reserves,
and saved these through buying U.S. Treasury bonds and others. The existing
international monetary system has led to a serious imbalance of international
payments. Under the existing system, some developing countries may keep the
upsurge of the current account surplus and foreign exchange reserves by the United
States’ persistent current-account deficit, while it is easy to cause the global excess
liquidity of the U.S dollar.
Therefore, in lacking an automatic adjustment mechanism to the international
balance of payments as well as with the unlimited expansion of the international
reserve credit, the Jamaica system has some fundamental shortcomings for avoiding
global financial crisis. One paradox of the unlimited expansion of the international
reserve credit is that the global adjustment function of the international monetary
system and U.S.’s economic growth were aggregated by the U.S. dollar standard,
which generally caused the dilemma between interest coordination and cost sharing.
An important performance of the international payments imbalance is the
upsurge of peripheral countries’ foreign exchange reserves. In recent decades, the
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United States has faced wide-ranging and long-lasting deficits of current accounts
and capital accounts, and the exact data are shown in Table 1.
Meanwhile, some emerging economies have a high surplus of current accounts
(Lilia 2009, pp. 79–89), as represented by China. In addition to China, India, Brazil,
and other developing countries’ foreign exchange reserves have also experienced
rapid growth in recent years. Of course, a country’s foreign exchange reserve is not
necessarily ‘‘the more, the better.’’ According to Development Economics theory, in
order to achieve the maximum economic benefit, the economic behavior’s marginal
cost must equal its marginal revenue. From this viewpoint, when the marginal cost
of a country’s foreign exchange reserves equals the marginal revenue, the reserve
amount is a modest one. In different countries, there may be different ways to
measure a country’s foreign exchange reserves. This article will take China as an
example while using the Agar Wall model to test the appropriate scale of foreign
exchange reserves and compare it with China’s actual foreign exchange reserves.
The Agar Wall sets up a moderate scale model of the developing countries’
foreign exchange reserves:
R ¼ Wðlg k þ lg q2  lg q1Þ= lg p
where R represents a moderate scale of foreign exchange reserves, k is the












Fig. 1 International resource flows diagram under the existing international monetary system







2000 -4462.33 674.53 -3787.8
2001 -4219.80 575.86 -3643.93
2002 -4573.45 548.21 -4205.24
2003 -5415.44 473.61 -4941.83
2004 -6656.31 562.86 -6093.45
2005 -7358.01 696.25 -7141.76
2006 -8394.56 802.16 -7592.4
2007 -8231.92 1210.93 -7020.99
2008 -8346.52 1358.5 -6988.02
2009 -5069.44 1210.36 -3749.08
2010 -6458.77 1458.3 -5000.27
Sources of data http://www.ben.doc.gov
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to the total output, q1 is the import content of the additional capital, and p is the
probability of deficit. However, considering the low elasticity of demand for
China’s import and export and that the balance-of-payments adjustment is slow, we
will adopt the revised Agar Wall model to measure the appropriate scale of China’s
foreign exchange reserves. The model is as follows:
R ¼ Wðlg k þ lg q2  lg q1Þ= lg p þ aD þ bI þ A
where D is the balance of foreign debts, I represents the accumulated balance for
FDI, A represents the Risk Development Fund, a represents the external debt service
ratio, and b represents the foreign direct investment margin. This article will use the
revised Agar Wall model to estimate our moderate scale in foreign exchange
reserves for each year of 2000–2011. The raw data used for calculation come from
the China Financial Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook of China Taiwan
database. Based on international experience, a is generally defined as between 12
and 18 %, b is generally defined as between 10 and 15 %, and A is generally defined
as between 5 %R and 10 %R. In the model k can be expressed as the total
investment of fixed assets/GDP, q1 represents the imported primary products/new
fixed asset investment, and q2 represents the imported primary products/GDP. Since
China’s 34 years of reform and opening up, there has been an increase of trade
deficit up to a total of nine times, and the probability of occurrence is 9/34.
Moreover, in 1985, there was the largest trade deficit in China with the amount of
the deficit up to $ 14.9 billion, and so we can set W = 149.
Foreign reserves in moderate scale should be in some range, and the upper limit
Rmax, the lower limit Rmin, and the value in Rmin can be respectively expressed as
Rmax ¼ ½Wðlg k þ lg q2  lg q1Þ= lg p þ 18%D þ 15%I=0:9
Rmin ¼ ½Wðlg k þ lg q2  lg q1Þ= lg p þ 12%D þ 10%I=0:95
Rmid ¼ ðRmax þ RminÞ=2
Table 2 shows the estimated values of k, q1, and q2 and during 2000–2011, the
moderate scale of China’s foreign exchange reserves is shown in Table 3.
As seen from Table 3, since 2000, China’s foreign exchange reserve has grown
rapidly. Its value in 2011, compared with 2000, is up by 1821.3 %. Meanwhile, the
actual foreign currency reserves are above the upper limit of the moderate scale of
foreign exchange reserves, exceeding 21.318 billion in 2000, 430.841 billion in
2004, 16.95767 billion in 2008, and 2814.242 billion in 2011. These data
sufficiently show that China’s foreign exchange reserves are increasing too fast and
far beyond a reasonable range.
Developing countries lack mature financial markets, and their huge foreign
exchange reserves usually outflow back to developed countries by buying financial
assets, thus driving down long-term interest rates in developed countries’ financial
markets (Zhang and Guo 2009, pp. 46–49).The future monetary system may be a
mixed system, the balance of international payments of which may be achieved
through a variety of regulatory mechanisms and determined by all the participating
countries (Dominick 2000, pp. 133–148). While, in the current situation, it is
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difficult for the U.S. dollar-dominated international monetary system to get rid of
the ‘‘Triffin dilemma2’’, therefore, it easily results in the imbalance of international
payments.
Table 2 1985–2011: k, q1, and q2 estimated values
Year k q1 q2
2000 0.332 1.263 0.039
2001 0.339 0.881 0.035
2002 0.361 0.649 0.034
2003 0.409 0.499 0.044
2004 0.441 0.651 0.061
2005 0.483 0.661 0.066
2006 0.521 0.707 0.071
2007 0.557 0.672 0.074
2008 0.573 0.710 0.086
2009 0.669 0.665 0.059
2010 0.707 0.654 0.072
2011 0.660 0.701 0.081
Table 3 Modest foreign exchange reserves during 2000–2011 in China. (Unit: 100 million U.S. dollars)








2000 1442.56 1091.25 1266.91 1655.74
2001 1535.45 1139.20 1337.33 2121.65
2002 1583.52 1156.19 1369.86 2864.07
2003 1636.89 1164.51 1400.70 4032.51
2004 1790.91 1256.44 1523.67 6099.32
2005 1977.12 1367.96 1672.54 8188.72
2006 2155.89 1477.66 1816.77 10663.44
2007 2361.97 1601.56 1981.77 15282.49
2008 2502.63 1685.55 2094.09 19460.3
2009 2784.75 1869.88 2327.31 23991.52
2010 3167.73 2101.09 2634.41 28473.38
2011 3669.06 2418.53 3043.79 31811.48
Note lower limit, upper limits, and middle value of foreign exchange reserves are derived from the model
calculations; the actual foreign exchange reserves data are from the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange website.(http://www.safe.gov.cn)
2 The Triffin dilemma means the conflict of economic interests, which arises between short-term
domestic and long-term international objectives when a national currency also serves as a world reserve
currency. The dilemma of choosing between these objectives was first identified in the 1960s by Belgian–
American economist Robert Triffin. He pointed out that the country, currency of which serves as the
global reserve currency, must be willing to supply the world with an extra supply of its currency to fulfill
world’s demand for these foreign exchange reserves, and thus cause a trade deficit.
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2.2 Frequent Fluctuations of International Exchange Rates are a Major
Incentive of Global Financial Risk
There does not exactly exist a binding international regime in the current international
monetary system, and it does not have a clear arrangement about which countries are
free to choose a fixed or a floating exchange rate (Oliver et al. 2011, pp. 3–4). Since the
establishment of a floating exchange rate system in 1973, the exchange rate which may
make a greater fluctuation is an incontrovertible increase to transaction costs, and
affects international trade at the same time (Oliver et al. 2011, pp. 776–785). Adopting
a floating exchange rate system is thought to be a measure to suppress the outbreak of
financial crisis by many economists. Compared with the previous fixed exchange rate,
under a floating exchange rate system, there is no reduction of government
intervention in the foreign currency market and the international currency reserves
(Dominick 1998, pp. 375–415). Under the floating exchange rate system, each
country’s currency exchange rate may fluctuate greatly, which not only happens in
developing countries, but also among the developed countries.
From Table 4, we can see that in 3 years, the exchange rate among several
currencies fluctuated dramatically, especially the exchange rate between the USD and
JPY. During the half year, i.e., from June to December of 2007, the fluctuation in the
rate between the USD and JPY reached 8.9 %, and in comparison with December
2007, the scope of its fluctuation reached 24.3 % in December 2010. Exchange rate is
one of the most important links in the international monetary system, because it not
only provides price signals to market participants, but also sets a key factor to global
rational resource allocation. A floating exchange rate has exacerbated the turmoil of
the international financial market, resulting in the overflow of currency arbitrage,
interest arbitrage, and other short-term speculative activities. Simultaneously, the
volatility and deviation of the main international currencies’ exchange rates have
brought tremendous negative effects to emerging economies (Xiu 2008, pp. 5–9).
According to some critics of emerging economies, the United States may take
advantage of the floating exchange rate system but not undertake obligations of
keeping the stability of exchange rate, simultaneously gaining benefits from reducing
debts through the U.S. dollar’s depreciation. As the floating exchange rate system in
Table 4 Spot exchange rates between certain groups of currencies
peso/lille Malaysian dollar/THB USD/JPY USD/EUR
2007.06.01 0.1776 9.6862 122.0500 0.7433
2007.12.01 0.1647 9.1540 111.2300 0.6831
2008.06.01 0.1576 9.9764 105.4900 0.6426
2008.12.01 0.1723 9.8452 93.1670 0.7927
2009.06.01 0.1741 9.8224 96.5700 0.7060
2009.12.01 0.1338 9.8125 86.6690 0.6662
2010.06.01 0.1424 9.8440 91.2400 0.8124
2010.12.01 0.1375 9.5839 84.1800 0.7700
Source According to the relevant data collected from http://cn.reuters.com
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the international monetary system has been doubted increasingly, it is urgent for all
nations to explore a new and reasonable exchange rate system.
2.3 International Monetary System Dominated by Few Big Powers has led
to Irrational Allocation of Resources in International Society
On the background of economic globalization, the quantitative easing (QE)
monetary policy in the United States has caused the overflow of global liquidity;
meanwhile, the allocation of global savings may not be optimized, and these are
closely related to institutional deficiencies of the international monetary system
(Yan 2011). In recent years, one of the goals of the U.S. dollar’s continuous
depreciation has been to downsize the U.S.’s domestic trade deficit, while the U.S.
dollar’s depreciation has brought adverse impact on some countries’ exports. From
the perspective of developing countries including China, because of the interna-
tional U.S. dollar standard, the United States may influence global resource
allocation through adjusting its monetary policy, which also makes other countries,
especially developing countries, become risk takers as a result of the U.S.’s
economic volatility. In general, developing countries’ interests face severe threats;
they might fall victims to the monetary policy adjustment by some dominating
countries in the international monetary system. Although some developing countries
hope to get rid of this unfavorable situation by taking some measures, under the
current system, however, they face great challenges to bring out significant benefits.
Besides, due to the advantages of the developed countries’ economic strength, the
developed countries may gain more when making the policy game with developing
countries. Therefore, in the decision-making of international monetary system, the
developed countries may take a complete dominant position, while developing
countries can only take subordinate positions, passively accepting developed
countries’ arrangements.
Figure 2 shows a simple complete information dynamic game picture. If
a [ e[c [ g, and b [ d, then the Nash Equilibrium in this refined game model is
(reform system, accept; if e [ a[g [ c,and f [ h, then the Nash Equilibrium in this










reform system keep system
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picture, from it, we can see that the developed countries have the priority option of
reforming or keeping the existing international monetary system, while the developing
countries can only passively accept the developed countries’ arrangements. Further-
more, it proves that developing countries suffer disadvantaged positions in the current
international monetary system, and there is some internal impetus from developing
countries to push forward international monetary system reform.
3 The Basic Path of China’s Participation in Institutional Innovation
of the International Monetary System
With the deepening of economic globalization, the interdependence between China
and the world is also being strengthened. It is increasingly apparent that the current
international monetary system has brought forth adverse impact on China. The
global financial crisis in 2008 also made China suffer a huge shock. Although China
was the first country which shook off the crisis, the crisis still made China rethink
the current international monetary system. In recent years, China has actively
participated in the institutional innovation of the international monetary system, and
determined what is required to build a more just and rational international monetary
system. The following text, from the perspective of institutional supply, will analyze
the process of China’s participation in the international monetary system reform.
3.1 To Promote Actively the Diversification of the International Monetary
System and the RMB’s Internationalization
Although there exist many hidden perils in the U.S. dollar hegemony, it is too
difficult to find a proper international reserve currency to replace the U.S. dollar in
the current international monetary system. Nonetheless, China still advocates the
diversification of the international monetary system as well as the RMB’s
internationalization. In March 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s
Bank of China, proposed to establish a kind of super-sovereign reserve currency,
which may not be connected with a sovereign state, to replace the U.S. dollar and
avoid the inherent flaws caused by sovereign credit (Zhou 2009). This idea was
rapidly favored by Russia, Brazil, and some other countries after it was proposed.
However, as a goal of long-term reform, this proposal did not have great practical
significance. Therefore, the Chinese government did not officially propose to
establish a super-sovereign currency, but took certain actions to promote the
diversification of the international monetary system instead. In the future, the
international monetary system may emerge just as Mundell (2000, pp. 327–340)
described, as ‘‘three stable islands in the global finance,’’ a tripartite situation of the
U.S. dollar, euro, and one kind of Asian currency. Besides the process of promoting
the diversification of the international reserve currency, China is also promoting the
internationalization of the RMB. It is not only the demand of economic
development in China, but also the demand of balancing the development of the
international monetary system. Under the process of the RMB’s internationaliza-
tion, China needs patience and should carry it out step by step, and make it
China and the International Monetary System Reform 295
123
appropriate to China’s economic developing stage. The basic process of the RMB’s
internationalization is seen in Fig. 3
About the internationalization of a currency, so far, there is no clear definition in
the academic circles. This article tends to regard the RMB’s internationalization as a
process from the current regional reserve currency to the world’s main reserve
currency. It can be predicted that the internationalization of RMB will never be
smooth, and it may be blocked by other international currencies; for instance, in
East Asia, the yen is a strong competitor of RMB to be the international currency.
How may the RMB achieve the goal of internationalization effectively? In the
following, this article will use the asymmetric evolutionary game model to analyze
the challenges for RMB’s internationalization. It is supposed that RMB is a
potential international currency, China is set up as X, and the other countries which
own the international currency as Y.
In the model of Table 5, i indicates the benefit of cooperation, a1 indicates the
loss of the X against the confrontation, a2 indicates the loss of the Y against the
confrontation, and a1 [ a2 [ i [ 0. If both X and Y take confrontation strategy, and





. If X and Y take cooperation strategy, then both parties have half chance of
gain, but no loss. If the cooperation strategy encounters confrontation strategy, then
the confrontation strategy gains, but the cooperative strategy does not.
To X, the probability of strategy M1 to be chosen is a, and the probability of
strategy M2 to be chosen is 1  a. To Y, the probability of strategy M1 been chosen
is b, and the probability of strategy M2 to be chosen is 1  b. Then,
The dynamic equation for X is da
dt





The dynamic equation for Y is da
dt





With these two dynamic equations, you can get five equilibrium points simulta-
neously: (a ¼ 0; b ¼ 0), (a ¼ 1; b ¼ 1), (a ¼ 0; b ¼ 1), (a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0), and
(a ¼ 1  i
a2
; b ¼ 1  i
a1
). Through the analysis of the characteristic values of these
Increasing demand for the 
RMB from outside
Peripheral circulation of the RMB 
in China’s surrounding countries
By use of the RMB in border trade and tourism, 
the RMB’s influence in China’s surrounding areas 
is improved.
RMB regionalization in Asia
By participation in East Asian monetary 
cooperation, to establish an offshore RMB 






By speeding up FDI of RMB assets and 
issuing RMB-denominated debt overseas, to 
enhance the RMB's influence in the world.
Fig. 3 The basic path of RMB’s internationalization
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five equilibrium points, we can see that the first and the second equilibrium points are
unstable, while the third and the fourth equilibrium points tend to be stable, and the
fifth equilibrium point is a mixed strategy of Nash Equilibrium.
From Fig. 4, the final convergence of equilibrium points are (a ¼ 0; b ¼ 1),
(a ¼ 1;b ¼ 0) and (a ¼ 1  i
a2
; b ¼ 1  i
a1
). Taking the actual situation into
consideration, the initial situation that falls into the region D has a larger
probability, and thus two parties will eventually converge to the evolutionary stable
strategy, that is, (a ¼ 1; b ¼ 0), and X will take the cooperation strategy, and Y
will take the confrontation strategy. The actual situation can confirm this analysis;
some countries with strong currencies tend to take a confrontation strategy to
impede other currency to be an international currency. At the present stage, the
United States has monetary power in the international monetary system. In the
reform of the international monetary system, it also holds an attitude of
noncooperation, and may not wish to see the RMB or other currency become an
international currency. Therefore, the United States has constantly criticized the
RMB exchange rate in recent years. In March 2013, 101 senators of the United
States proposed legislation to claim China as a ‘‘currency manipulator.’’ Therefore,
in order to achieve its goal of the RMB’s internationalization, China may not look to
any country which has dominant monetary power, but to strengthen cooperation
with other countries on the basis of ‘‘increase of China’s strength.’’ At the present
stage, China has made significantly useful attempts to promote the RMB’s
internationalization, and accomplished some achievements, such as RMB circula-
tion and RMB reserves in neighboring countries. In Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Singapore, non-deliverable forward market and some other offshore RMB
derivatives appear in international financial markets. In April 2005, the European
Central Bank increased some currencies including the RMB in the euro exchange
rate system guidance. In December 2006, the Philippines took the RMB as a central
bank reserve currency, and it was first time for the RMB to become another
country’s reserve currency. By the end of 2010, in Mongolia, the RMB has reached
a share of 60 % in payment, settlement, and reserve. In 2010 September, the
Malaysian central bank also began to buy RMB-denominated bonds as a part of its
foreign exchange reserves (Gao 2011, pp. 134–135). In the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and the surrounding countries of China, the RMB is used more
frequently and widely, and the external conditions of RMB’s internationalization
becomes more and more mature.
Of course, we understand that it will be a long process of promoting the RMB’s
internationalization and the diversification of the international monetary system
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(Pen 2010, pp. 46–49). It also needs China’s great efforts to make some appropriate
reform in the RMB’ s exchange rate formation mechanism, the balance-of-payments
adjustment mechanism, and the monitoring and management mechanisms.
3.2 To Vigorously Promote the Process of East Asian Monetary Cooperation
For developing countries including China, the core task is to change the
international U.S. dollar standard in the process of current international monetary
system reform. At the present stage, according to the theory of optimum currency
area (or Optimal Currency Area, OCA) which was proposed first by Robert
Mundell, East Asian countries may take a unified regional currency, for stabilizing
exchange rate system, obtaining the balance of international payments, and so on.
The subprime mortgage crisis makes Asian countries realize that there exist internal
defects and potential risks from the U.S. dollar standard. In July 2012, the 17th
session of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP)3
focused on Asian–Pacific monetary cooperation, and one of its main targets was to

















Fig. 4 X and Y asymmetric evolutionary model schematic diagrams
3 The Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) is a cooperative organization of
central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region. Its primary objective is to
strengthen the cooperation among its members. It comprises the central banks of 11 economies: Reserve
Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Indonesia, Bank of
Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank of Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bank of Pilipinas, Monetary




To prevent the negative externalities of the U.S. dollar standard, the best way
perhaps is to speed up the East Asian monetary integration. This article will describe
a simple analysis from the perspective of the institutional change of East Asian
monetary cooperation. One principle of Institutional Economics is that the
formation of a mechanism lies in demand factors. The changes of East Asian
monetary cooperation may be attributed to demand factors which resulted from the
East Asian financial crisis, East Asian countries’ economic development, rigidity of
the international monetary system, globalization and regionalization, and so on.
As we can see from Fig. 5, the initial system seems relatively steep, with low
elasticity. Under this condition, it will generate higher system costs to promote
system changes. The financial crisis of East Asia and development demand of each
country will drive the demand curve to shift from D0 to D1; in this process, it may
also produce a number of complementary system arrangements, but the cost of
system arrangement is relatively high. Hence, the supply curve S is relatively steep,
and lacks flexibility. In this case, only the supply curve moves to the right, from D0
to D2, it may cause changes of traditional mechanism, and establish a new system.
Currently, the East Asian monetary cooperation has made some substantial
progress in Chiang Mai Initiative, Asian currency unit, Asian bond market, and
regional exchange rate cooperation. Under the ‘‘10 ? 3’’ framework, East Asian
countries have strengthened the exchange data of capital flow with each other, and
by the end of 2012, China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with 18
countries, with the total amount of over 1.6 trillion RMB (Pbc, 2013). In practice,
China’s vigorous efforts in promoting the East Asian monetary cooperation have
made certain partial influence on enhancing Asia’s financial status, changing the
situation of the U.S. dollar standard in international monetary system, and
reconstructing the competitive and cooperative international currency system.
3.3 To Build Various Mechanisms of Multilateral Consultation
In order to push forward the current international monetary system reform, it is not







institution 0 1 2 3 4
Fig. 5 The institutional equilibrium model of monetary cooperation in East Asia
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the world, especially of some emerging markets and developing countries. The most
typical representatives of China’s participation in the changeable consultation
mechanism to advance international monetary system reform are G20 and
‘‘BRICS.’’4 In December 1999, finance ministers and central bank governors of
the G20 held the first informal meeting in Berlin, who established of the G20
mechanism. This is the first time that emerging countries were involved in the
discussion of the international financial governance structure. The establishment of
the G20 is seen as a crucial step toward international financial governance structure
reform (Randall 2001). Some unreasonableness of the current international
monetary system has already drawn the attention of the members of G20, and the
members declared that the international monetary system reform is necessary (Eric
2011). As a representative of developing countries, in each summit, China had
actively advocated the establishment of a new international financial order. But we
must also be aware that the existing G20 mechanism is not enough to assume the
responsibility of establishing the new international economic order, but it needs
long-term hard efforts for big powers to achieve that goal (Tan and Zhang 2009).
Therefore, BRICS mechanism may be an effective complementarity for G20
mechanism. The BRICS countries, the total area of which is about 30 % of the
world and the total population of which is about 43 % of the world’s population
(Stats 2010), include the global major developing countries and emerging markets
exerting powerful influence in the world.
Through participation in various international multilateral mechanisms, as shown
in Fig. 6, including G20, China tries to promote the diversity of the international
monetary system, improve the reserve currency issuing regulatory mechanism, and
maintain the relative stability of the exchange rate of major reserve currencies to
create favorable conditions for international monetary system reform. Different
from G7 or G8 consisting of the developed countries, G20 mechanism has allowed
developing countries to participate in global economic governance, and also
provides some major developing powers with a platform to solve international
affairs, represented by the fact that China and India are increasingly involved in the
decision-making of international economic affairs. However, the urgent tasks of
participants in the G20 mechanism in the near term are to collectively promote the
reform of the international monetary system, offer a comprehensive platform to
carry out international economic policy coordination for various national interests,
and achieve the target of ‘‘imbalance controlment’’ and ‘‘dollar risk restraint.’’
3.4 To Actively Promote IMF and World Bank’s Structural Reforms
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the world’s most important
financial institutions, with the task of promoting international monetary cooperation,
and playing a significant role in the consultation and collaboration of international
monetary issues. However, the IMF has not accomplished its task well. In 2008, the
4 The 2001 American Goldman Sachs first proposed the ‘‘BRIC’’ concept, including the world’s four
largest emerging market countries (Brazil, Russian, Indian, and China); in December 2010, the four




IMF had the responsibility to prevent the global financial crisis, but failed. the IMF
has taken some internal reform, but the goal is not to solve its unfair governance
structure. The decision-making power of the IMF is still held by some wealthy
countries. The reform of the IMF’s governance structure has become a worldwide
concern, especially by emerging markets and developing countries. China is a
strong supporter as well as an active participant in the IMF reform, which has
already made a substantial step. The Chinese government has repeatedly expressed
willingness to buy the bonds issued by the IMF. In June 2010, ministers and central
bank governors of G20 reached a historic agreement on the IMF quota reform, and
determined to transfer over 6 % share of the IMF to the emerging economies. But, at
the same time, the United States’ share is more than 15 %, which means that the
United States still has the veto power in the IMF, and the status of the U.S. dollar
hegemony in the IMF has not been shaken. Therefore, it requires a more significant
institutional innovation in the IMF for shifting more IMF shares and the vote rights
to emerging markets (Chen and Chen 2010, pp. 56–61).
Like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank is also a globally important
international economic organization, which plays a significant role in the world’s
economic development. The World Bank reform focuses on decision-making
mechanism reform. As one of the world’s largest financial organizations, the
decision-making mechanism of the World Bank should be institutionalized and
democratic in functioning. But, under the current situation, there exists serious
political interference in the decision-making of the World Bank, and both the
development strategy and decision-making procedure of the IMF are controlled by a
few developed countries. China appealed frequently that the World Bank needs to be
reformed at the G20 conference, and received wide support and response from
developing countries. In practice, there were achieved some initial results in the World
Bank’s reform. On April 25, 2010, the World Bank Development Committee passed a
voting scheme by transferring more vote rights from the developed countries to
developing ones. For some of the exact changes of the IMF vote rights distribution, see
The main multilateral cooperative mechanism 




















Fig. 6 Concise schematic diagram of China’s participation in the multilateral cooperation mechanism
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Fig. 7. Of course, this is only a small step toward World Bank’s reform; however, the
voting procedure, supervision mechanism, and some other aspects of the World Bank
also have much room for reform. For China, what it expects of the World Bank is not its
arbitrary nature, but an organization with the ability to represent the interests of
developing countries, having fair decision-making mechanisms in place.
Under the scarcity of funds, some scholars argue that countries with a large amount
of foreign exchange reserves and huge potential for economic growth may not be
restricted by the so-called international rules (liu 2009, p. 28). But, in the present
situation, the international monetary system has certain constraints on China’s
economic development. For China, it is an appropriate time to participate in the IMF
reform and the World Bank reform, and it is a good opportunity to promote China’s
status in international society through international monetary system’s reform.
4 Prospect of China’s Participation in the International Monetary System
Reform
In recent years, China has taken active part in the reform of the international
monetary system. Meanwhile, China has taken many concrete measures, and
accomplished some achievements in institutional innovation of the international
monetary system. From the practices, it seems clear that China holds a strong will to
reform the international monetary system. We may have some prospects of China’s
participation in the international monetary system reform as follows:
4.1 Chinese Elements will be Increased in the International Monetary System
There is no doubt that the current international monetary system is dominated by the
United States and the other developed countries. But with China’s rapid economic
growth and great progress in domestic mechanism, the RMB’s internationalization
tends to be strengthened. As the RMB’s internationalization is gradually improved,
Fig. 7 IMF voting rights distribution after reform. source: www.xinhuanet.com
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the RMB’s influence in the world is to be enhanced, and it also means that the RMB
will play a more important role in the international monetary system. In the reforms
of the IMF, the World Bank, and other major global financial institutions, China’s
involvement will continue to increase, and as an opaque goal, China not only wants
to be a performer of global financial rules, but also a maker.
4.2 China Faces Greater External Pressure in the International Monetary System
As Chinese elements in the international monetary system have been greatly
enhanced, China will face much more external pressures than ever. Take the
example of RMB exchange rate: at the present stage, the United States and the
European Union have put great pressure on RMB’s appreciation, and China faces
huge pressure to make the RMB’s appreciation. At the same time, as China shares
more voice in the IMF, the World Bank, and other global financial institutions,
China has to shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations, which will
undoubtedly make China face more external pressures and challenges.
4.3 Continuous Institutional Adjustment of International Monetary System will
be made Between the Traditional Powers and Emerging Powers
In recent years, China, India, Brazil, and other emerging countries have continued to
rise in the world, and these emerging countries have growing influence upon the
international monetary system. In addition to their own striking economic
development, they have also created a variety of cooperation mechanisms which
may offer opportunities for more developing countries to speak in international
economic affairs. One of the most successful examples is the ‘‘BRICS’’ Mechanism.
The BRICS countries have currently implemented the cooperation mechanism of
currency settlement to reduce risk from interest rate fluctuation of the U.S. dollar. At
the same time, it is beneficial for BRICS countries to promote respective statuses in
the international monetary system by the rapid growth of foreign trade and
investment, and a variety of financial services with high efficiency among BRICS
members. Therefore, since the subprime mortgage crisis happened, Europe and the
United States have suffered the economic recession with high unemploy-
ment, while the BRICS countries may keep fast economic growth, and play an
important role in global economic recovery.
With the rapid rise of emerging countries as well as with increasing unity and
cooperation among emerging countries, it can be predicted that the traditional great
powers dominating the international monetary system will face more challenges
than ever, and emerging countries represented by China will share a more
significant voice in the international monetary system.
5 Conclusion
From the gold standard system to the Bretton Woods system, each of the
international monetary systems has played an important role in a certain historical
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period, and been destroyed by its own shortcomings. The existing international
monetary system still belongs to the continuation of the Jamaica system, and still it
cannot break away from the traditional shortcomings. In the Jamaica system, the
United States has established a set of international rules which treat the U.S. dollar
as standard currency and serve the United States for rational logic of national
interest. While for China and many other developing countries, those international
rules may neglect developing countries’ rational demands, and be regarded as the
internal defects of the Jamaica system. For the internal defects of the Jamaica
system, it is necessary to make current international monetary system reform by
China and other developing countries.
In order to ensure the healthy development of China’s economic and financial
securities, China must play a more active role in international monetary system’s
reform, especially in respect of the institutional supply. However, in the short term,
the international monetary system may not be significantly reformed; the U.S. dollar
hegemony will be maintained for a long period; and the international monetary
system will be dominated by the traditional powers for a long time. To promote the
reform of the international monetary system, the most feasible way for developing
countries is to focus on economic development, and continuously strengthen unity
and cooperation among themselves. For China, the main task now is to keep the
high speed of economic growth, and complete ‘‘soft landing’’ in economic
development.5 Though China has a strong desire to promote international monetary
system’s reform and the RMB’s internationalization, it is important for China to
explore an optimal way to keep China’s long-term sustainable development under
the current international monetary system and share common interests with various
countries. It also requires China to cooperate with the world, including both
emerging countries and the developed countries.
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